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PROCEDURES FOR TERMINATION OF UTILITY
SERVICE: THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS
INTRODUCTION
The procedures employed by utility companies for the ter-
mination of service have been attacked on constitutional due
process grounds with increasing frequency in recent years.'
Although the termination procedures of Kentucky utility com-
panies have not been subjected to such attack, the rash of
litigation in this area renders it appropriate to consider the
requirements of due process under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments2 in the context of these procedures.
Such an inquiry cannot be conducted in the abstract, for
any due process determination turns largely on the surrounding
facts and circumstances. Therefore, this analysis will be lim-
ited to privately-owned Kentucky utilities which purchase
their power from the Tenneesee Valley Authority (TVA). This
factual framework is common in Kentucky and presents an
unusual interplay of state and federal regulatory involvement.3
Due process issues must be resolved through a two-step
See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Palmer v.
Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co.,
406 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th
Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350
F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Hattel v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F.Supp. 240 (D. Colo.
1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. ."
I The relevant governmental regulations upon a public utility in Kentucky which
purchases its power from the Tennessee Valley Authority may be found in Tennessee
Valley Authority Act, 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1970) [hereinafter cited as TVA Act]; Ky. REv.
STAT. §§ 278.010-.460 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS]; Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
Reg., 807 Ky. ADMIN. REG. 2:010 (1975) [hereinafter cited as KAR]. Kentucky law
provides for the complete and exclusive regulation of municipally owned and operated
electric companies which purchase power from TVA by a publicly selected municipal
Electric Plant Board. Tennessee Valley Authority Act, KRS § 96.550-.900 (1970). The
Kentucky Public Service Commission is expressly denied jurisdiction. KRS § 96.880
(1970). The courts have clearly recognized that any action by such a board constitutes
state action for due process purposes. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Chiaffitelli
v. Dettmer Hosp., Inc., 437 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1971); Meredith v. Allen County War
Mem. Hosp. Comm'n, 397 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1968).
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process. First, it must be determined that the questioned activ-
ity was perpetuated under the authority of the state.'
The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any
such authority, is simply a private wrong . . .but if not
sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under State
authority, [the victim's] rights remain in full force ....
This abrogation and denial of rights, for which the States
alone were or could be responsible, was the great seminal and
fundamental wrong which was intended to be remedied.5
This basic distinction between nonremediable private action
and constitutionally limited state action has been reiterated on
numerous occasions,' but its application always entails the dif-
ficult process of balancing the peculiar facts of each case.7
"Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-
obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attrib-
uted its true significance."'
Once this hurdle has been negotiated, the plaintiff must
prove that the state action is a violation of due process. Again,
the demands of due process must be ascertained on a case by
case basis. This determination requires that the " . . . nature
of the affected interest, the manner in which it has been ad-
versely affected, the reasons for which it was affected and the
viable alternatives to the challenged procedure. . "... be care-
fully weighed.'
I. STATE ACTION ' "
The question of whether state action is present in the ter-
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5 Id. at 17-18. (emphasis added).
8 See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney,
396 U.S. 435 (1970). See also Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEX. L. REV.
347 (1963).
2 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Public Util. Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir.
1973). See also Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without
Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41
TEX. L. REv. 347 (1963); The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REv.40 (1961).
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951).
,0 The term "state action" is used in this section in its generic sense rather than
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mination of electrical service by a private utility company was
recently addressed by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co.1 This case involved a challenge to the pro-
cedure employed by Metropolitan Edison-a privately owned
Pennsylvania utility corporation holding a certificate of public
convenience from the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commis-
sion and thereby subject to extensive state regulation-for the
termination of electric service to the plaintiff for nonpayment
of her bill.1 2 The plaintiff alleged that the failure of the com-
pany to afford notice, a hearing, and an opportunity to pay any
amount due prior to termination violated the due process re-
quirements of the fourteenth amendment. She argued that she
was therefore entitled to damages and injunctive relief under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.'"
Ms. Jackson buttressed her argument with the claim that
the right to reasonably continuous electrical service was a
"property right"1 4 conferred upon her by a Pennsylvania stat-
ute providing: "Every public utility shall furnish and maintain
adequate, efficient, safe and reasonable services and facili-
ties. . . . Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and
without unreasonable interruptions or delay." 5 Thus, the
to indicate action by a particular level of government. Although it is important to note
that federal action invokes the fifth amendment due process clause while state action
triggers the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court has ruled that the guarantees
of the two amendments are basically identical. Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 325
(1903). Additionally, the Court has applied the tests for finding state action and federal
action interchangeably, frequently cross-referencing the two types of cases. See
generally Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1951). Therefore, a finding of
governmental action on either the state or federal level, although invoking the due
process clauses of different amendments, will have the same constitutional effect. See
also Schatte v. International Alliance of Stage Employees, 70 F. Supp. 1008, 1010-11
(S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 165 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 812 (1947); Bartlett
Trust Co. v. Elliot, 30 F.2d 700, 701 (E.D. Mo. 1929), aff'd, 40 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1930);
16 Ari. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 542 (1964); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 567
(1956).
" 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
22 Ms. Jackson was two months delinquent on her electric bill and was informed
by the company 4 days before the termination that her electric meter had been tamp-
ered with so as not to record the amount of electricity used.
13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). This statute provides damages and injunctive relief for
violations inflicted "under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation. . . of any
State . . . ." Id.
, 419 U.S. at 348 n.2.
25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1950).
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plaintiff contended Metropolitan Edison's termination of her
service for nonpayment, an action permitted by the company's
general tariff filed with the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Com-
mission,'" was state action depriving her of property without
due process of law. 7
The Court, applying the test developed in Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis,'8 concluded that a sufficiently close nexus did
not exist between the state of Pennsylvania and the challenged
action of Metropolitan Edison to allow the actions of the utility
to be fairly termed the actions of the state.'9 The Court deter-
mined that neither Metropolitan Edison's partial monopoly on
furnishing electrical service, conditioned upon extensive state
regulation, nor the inclusion of the termination procedure in
the tariff filed with the Commission was sufficient to justify a
finding of state action. Consequently, the utility's termination
procedure was merely private action and not subject to the due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court's mode of analysis in Jackson was "fundamen-
tally sequential," 0 considering numerous factors in isolation
Is PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1142 (1959) requires every public utility to file a tariff
with the Public Utilities Commission showing all rates established by the utility. There
is no requirement that the tariff include the procedure for initiation or termination of
service. However, Metropolitan Edison did include a provision in its tariff which
stated: "Company reserves the right to discontinue its service on reasonable notice and
to remove its equipment in the case of non-payment of bill. . . ."419 U.S. at 346 n.1.
The Commission never subjected this provision to any hearing or other scrutiny. Id.
at 354.
'1 The Court decided this case on state action grounds and did not decide whether
the right to continued electrical service constituted "property" for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment. Id. at 359. An argument can be made that the property right
sought to be protected lies in the contract between the plaintiff and the utility com-
pany for the provision of electrical service. Valid contracts have been held to constitute
property rights under the fifth amendment, see, e.g., Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
571 (1934), and the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Superior Water, Light & Power
Co. v. City of Superior, 263 U.S. 125 (1923); Boston Elevated Ry. v. Commonwealth,
39 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1942). For a general discussion of this problem see Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Shelton, The Shutoff of Utility Service for
Nonpayment: A Plight of the Poor, 46 WASH. L. REv. 745 (1971); Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439
(1968); Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to Render Adequate Service, 62 COLUM. L.
REv. 312 (1962).
' 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
" 419 U.S. at 351, 358-59.
2" Id. at 363 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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and dismissing each as individually insufficient to support a
finding of state action. Attention was never focused on the
impact of these factors as a whole. This method marked a sharp
departure from the analytical approach developed by the Court
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,2' which required
that all relevant facts and circumstances be weighed in the
aggregate to determine if their total impact was sufficient to
constitute state action.22
Because the Jackson decision appears to effectively under-
mine the viability of the "aggregate" approach, 2 this investiga-
tion into the presence of government action in the termination
procedures of TVA-supplied Kentucky utilities will utilize the
sequential method. The arguments presented by Ms. Jackson
and the manner in which the Court responded provide an excel-
lent framework for this analysis.
A. "Affected With the Public Interest"
The argument was presented in Jackson that the concept
of state action should be expanded to include the conduct of
all businesses "affected with the public interest. '2 4 The Court
refused to so expand the state action concept, quoting Nebbia
v. New York 5 for its rationale:
It is clear that there is no closed class or category of
businesses affected with a public interest .... The phrase
"affected with a public interest" can, in the nature of things,
mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is
subject to control for the public good. In several of the deci-
sions of this court wherein the expressions "affected with a
public interest," and "clothed with a public use," have been
brought forward as the criteria. . . it has been admitted that
21 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2 Id. at 722-26. See generally Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
z This "aggregate" approach had been utilized in several of the cases involving
challenges to utility termination procedures. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc.,
479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th
Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350
F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
24 419 U.S. at 353.
- 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
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they are not susceptible of definition and form an unsatisfac-
tory test .... 21
The Court also observed: "The argument has been impliedly
rejected by this Court on a number of occasions. '2 Thus, given
the Supreme Court's reaction to this concept in Jackson, it
seems clear that the "affected with a public interest" argument
has been thoroughly discredited.
B. State Supported Monopoly Status
Ms. Jackson's first substantive claim was that Metropoli-
tan Edison's state-granted monopoly status justified a finding
of state action in its termination procedure. The Court dis-
missed this assertion, pointing out that neither Metropolitan's
certificate to operate in Pennsylvania nor any state statute
mentioned a monopoly status," and that the Court had pre-
viously disclaimed reliance upon monopoly status in order to
find state action.29
The majority's position in Jackson makes it doubtful that
a utility's conduct in Keritucky would constitute state action,
based solely upon the monopolistic status of its operations.
However, Justice Marshall's dissent in Jackson attacked the
majority's conclusion that governmental regulation did not
contribute to Metropolitan's monopoly.30 He questioned
whether electric companies would be free from competition
were it not for the government's prohibition of high profit mar-
gins and pressure for state ownership. These two governmental
policies, which Marshall viewed as insuring the utility's contin-
ued monopoly status, are clearly manifested in the Tennessee
Valley Authority Act,31 which expressly encourages governmen-
tal ownership of utilities32 and requires that electrical resale
21 419 U.S. at 353.
Id. at 354 n.9.
21 Id. at 351 n.8.
22 Id. at 352, citing Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
11 419 U.S. at 366-68. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1970).
32 16 U.S.C. § 831-i (1970), which provides: "[I]n the sale of such current by the
Board it shall give preference to States, counties, municipalities, and cooperative
organizations . .. ."
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rates be determined by the TVA Board of Directors.3 In view
of the explicit nature of these policies and the close relationship
between the Kentucky utility companies in question and TVA,
the utilities' monopoly status could possibly lead to a finding
of state action.
C. Public Function
The plaintiff next contended that, due to the Pennsylvania
statutory requirement that public utilities furnish electric ser-
vice on a reasonably continuous basis,34 Metropolitan Edison
performed an essential public function and that its actions
were therefore equivalent to those of the state." Speaking for
the Court, Justice Rehnquist responded that the power dele-
gated to the defendant was not one traditionally the responsi-
bility of the sovereign.36 Although the Pennsylvania statute
imposed a duty to provide continuous service upon Metropoli-
tan, it imposed no duty upon the state to provide such service.
In support of its rejection of this argument, the opinion cited a
Pennsylvania case decided prior to the turn of the century
which also rejected the claim that the furnishing of utility ser-
vice is a state function, 37 apparently ignoring the possibility
that the scope of acts which constitute a public function might
have expanded in the intervening 75 years.
The public function argument would be much more likely
to meet with success against a utility company which pur-
chases its power from the Tennessee Valley Authority. The
TVA Act evidences congressional recognition of a public re-
sponsibility to provide electric service. Stating that its purpose
is to encourage domestic use of electricity by providing it at low
16 U.S.C. § 831-k (1970) provides: "[The Board] shall require that any resale
of such electric power. . . be made. . . at prices that shall not exceed a schedule fixed
by the board .... "
" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1171 (1959). For the exact wording of the statute, see
text accompanying note 15 supra.
15 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974). The public func-
tion argument has been successful in a number of cases which deal with powers more
traditionally reserved to the state. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)
(municipal park); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)(election); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946)(company town).
1 419 U.S. at 353.
37 Bailey v. City of Philadelphia, 39 A. 494 (Pa. 1898).
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cost,3" the statute authorizes the TVA Board of Directors to
include in a contract for the sale of power to a private company
any terms and conditions deemed necessary to achieve that
purpose. 39 In addition, the Board is authorized to cancel any
contract with a private company if that power is needed to
supply the demands of government-owned electric systems."
Thus, a strong argument could be made that a private utility
supplied by TVA is involved in a broad governmental scheme
designed to perform a necessary public function, and that its
actions are so entwined with governmental policies that they
constitute state action.4'
D. State Authorization of the Termination Procedure
Ms. Jackson also asserted that state action should be
found because Pennsylvania specifically authorized and ap-
proved the procedure used by Metropolitan Edison.42 This
claim was based on the fact that the utility filed its general
tariff, containing the termination of service procedure, with the
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission.4 3 The Court found
that the sole relation of the Commission with this specific pro-
cedure was Metropolitan Edison's filing of the tariff and the
Commission's lack of opposition to it.44 The Court distin-
guished the circumstances in Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak,4 in which the Capital Transit Company's piping of
music into buses was found to be state action, on the ground
that the District of Columbia's Public Utilities Commission
commenced its own investigation of the music, and ruled it to
be "not inconsistent with public convenience."46 In Jackson the
16 U.S.C. § 831-i (1970).
3 16 U.S.C. § 831-i (1970), which provides: "[T]he Board is authorized to include
in any contract for the sale of power such terms and conditions. . . as in its judgment
may be necessary or desirable for carrying out the purposes of this chapter ... "
4 Id.
" Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). While this case does not deal specifi-
cally with utility companies, the test stated therein has been applied in a broad range
of state action cases.
12 419 U.S. at 354.
'3 For a discussion of the tariff and the filing requirements, see note 16 supra.
" 419 U.S. at 355.
'5 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
" Re Capital Transit Co., 81 P.U.R. (n.s.) 122, 126 (1950).
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Pennsylvania Commission placed no such imprimatur upon
the procedure. The majority concluded that unless a utility's
practice is ordered by a state agency, it is not approved or
initiated by the agency and, therefore, is not state action. 47
This issue presents the strongest basis for distinguishing
Jackson from an action that might be brought in Kentucky
against a private utility which purchases its power from the
TVA. In contrast to the role of the Pennsylvania Public Utili-
ties Commission, the Public Service Commission of Kentucky
prescribes specific regulations governing the requisite justifica-
tion and procedure for the termination of utility service:
A utility shall not be required to furnish service to any
• . . customer when such . . . customer is indebted to the
utility for service furnished until such . . . customer shall
have paid such indebtedness."
However no utility shall discontinue service to any cus-
tomer for non-payment of bills (including delayed charges)
without first having made a reasonable effort to induce the
customer to pay the same.49
In addition, the Kentucky Public Service Commission Regula-
tions explicitly state that a utility may discontinue service for
nonpayment upon 48 hours notice. Since all privately owned
utilities in Kentucky are required to conform to these regula-
tions,5' the procedure which a Kentucky utility company must
follow to terminate service is not merely authorized but pre-
scribed by the state. Under the Jackson test, this relationship
between the state and the utility would require that the proce-
dure be classified as state action.
E. "Symbiotic Relationship"
The final argument advanced in Jackson relied upon
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,5 in which the Court
419 U.S. at 357. See 807 KAR 2:010 § 11(2)(a) (1975).
807 KAR 2:010 § 11(1)(d) (1975).
807 KAR 2:010 § 11(2)(a) (1975).
50 Id.
51 KRS § 278.040 (1970).
52 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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ruled that the actions of a private restaurant business operated
in space rented in a municipal parking structure constituted
state action since there was a "symbiotic relationship" between
the business and the government. The Court based its finding
of interdependence on several factors: (1) the building was ded-
icated to public use; (2) the cost of acquisition and operation
was borne by the city, while the proceeds from rental and park-
ing services were enjoyed by the municipality; (3) the leased
area was not surplus state property, but physically and finan-
cially an integral part of the city's plan to operate the unit; (4)
the parking facility and restaurant mutually benefited from the
arrangement; and (5) the discrimination complained of con-
tributed to the financial success of the restaurant, and there-
fore the parking structure. 3 The majority in Jackson, limiting
Burton to cases involving lessees of public property, found that
Metropolitan was privately owned, did not lease facilities from
Pennsylvania, and was solely responsible for service to its cus-
tomers. Therefore, Metropolitan was not in such a position of
interdependence with the state that its actions constituted
state action.
Despite the Court's reaction to this theory in Jackson, the
argument could prove more successful in an action against a
utility which purchases electricity from the Tennessee Valley
Authority. The Court's limitation of the Burton doctrine to
cases involving lessees of the government could be overcome in
such a case in two ways. First, the private utility may actually
be leasing transmission lines from TVA pursuant to statutory
authorization.54 Second, it can be argued that the ongoing char-
acter of any purchase of electricity more nearly resembles a
lease than a sale and should therefore be interpreted as such.
If the Court's limited interpretation of Burton could be
overcome, the probability of proving a symbiotic relationship
would be good. The sale of electricity to private corporations
is of mutual benefit to the government and the utility. The
utility is permitted to purchase electricity being generated
53 Id.
54 16 U.S.C. § 831-k (1970) provides: "The board is also authorized to lease to any
person, persons, or corporation the use of any transmission line owned by the Govern-
ment and operated by the board. .. ."
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from existing power plants and to sell that electricity in a mar-
ket area which, in all likelihood, is lacking in any meaningful
competitive force. The federal government, on the other hand,
is able to profitably dispose of any excess power generated by
its TVA electric plants, while maintaining broad control over
the duration and terms of the sales contracts55 as well as the
price and manner of resale of the electricity to the consumer 5
Additionally, private sales secure sufficiently high load factors
and revenue returns for the TVA plants, thereby serving TVA's
primary purpose of providing low cost electricity for domestic
use. 57 These factors make it quite possible that the private
utility company is acting on behalf of and in conjunction with
the government to the extent that its activities will be deemed
state action under the Burton doctrine.
F. State Action Summary
There are three separate factors which distinguish the cir-
cumstances in Jackson from an action brought against a pri-
vate Kentucky utility which purchases its power from TVA.
First, the provisions of the TVA Act indicate that the Author-
ity's sale of power to a private utility and its eventual resale
are part of an important "public function." Second, the Public
Service Commission of Kentucky has regulations which, in ef-
fect, prescribe the termination of service procedure to be fol-
lowed by a privately owned utility. Finally, the relationship
between the utility and the government bears a much closer
resemblance to the "symbiotic relationship" described in
Burton than did the utility-government relationship in
Jackson. The Court's rejection of the aggregate approach in
Jackson necessitates that one of these factors must be suffi-
cient, by itself, to justify a finding of state action. There re-
main, however, strong indications that an action brought in
Kentucky, challenging the termination-of-service procedure of
a privately owned utility which purchases its power from TVA
would result in a finding of state action. It is therefore neces-
-" 16 U.S.C. § 831-i (1970). See note 39 supra.
50 16 U.S.C. § 831-k (1970). See note 33 supra.
57 16 U.S.C. § 831-i (1970).
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sary to examine the termination procedures of these utilities for
violations of the amorphous concept of due process of law.
II. DUE PROCESS
The term "due process of law" is not amenable to precise
definition. "ITihere is no table of weights and measures for
ascertaining what constitutes due process.""8 For this reason,
due process requirements vary in accordance with the particu-
lar facts of each case.59 There are, however, certain minimum
standards which may be gleaned from the cases. The affected
parties are entitled to notification of the impending state ac-
tion and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner."
Due to the failure of the Supreme Court to reach the due
process question in Jackson, the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc."1 would govern any case chal-
lenging the termination of service procedures of a Kentucky
utility on due process grounds. In Palmer, consumers of Colum-
bia Gas of Ohio sought declaratory and injunctive relief from
the statutorily authorized62 procedure employed to terminate
gas service. Under this procedure, a consumer who was two
months in arrears would receive a "shut-off" notice stating the
amount due and warning of impending termination. If the bill
was not paid within 5 days after the mailing of this notice,
service was terminated without further contact. The Sixth Cir-
cuit found this procedure to be in violation of due process.
The utility service termination procedure authorized by
the Kentucky Public Service Commission is strikingly similar
3 Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 149 (1953).
51 Due process is widely recognized as a flexible concept which depends upon a
careful balancing of the private and public interests involved in each case. See Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972); Ferguson v. Gathright, 485 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1973);
Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972); Duby v. American College of
Surgeons, 468 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1972).
" See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 223, 233 (1863).
61 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
62 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4933.12 (Page 1954). The procedure employed by Col-
umbia Gas was actually more liberal than necessary to comply with the statute. Al-
though the utility terminated service 5 days after notice, the statute only requires a
24-hour notice period.
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to that enjoined in Palmer. The only significant distinction lies
in the timing of the notice. The Columbia Gas policy required
termination 5 days after the notice was mailed, whereas the
Kentucky regulations permit termination 48 hours after receipt
of the notice by the customer.63 Otherwise, the procedures are
virtually identical. No provision exists in either scheme for a
pretermination hearing conducted by an independent fact
finder or for the continuance of electrical service until any dis-
pute is settled. The only recourse available is court action.
During the entire pendancy of any such litigation, the con-
sumer would be denied service.14
The determinative factor in Palmer was the complete fail-
ure of the company to provide any established procedure for
the resolution of disputes over the accuracy of the unpaid bill.65
"The mere theoretical possibility of informal resolution cannot
serve as a substitute for a mandatory procedural mechanism
designed to prevent unjust deprivations of important property
interests."6 The court also noted that appeal through the
courts did not provide a meaningful hearing because low-
income consumers are both the most likely to have their service
terminated and the least able to bear the expense of civil litiga-
tion 6 7 On the basis of this reasoning, it seems probable that the
termination-of-service procedure employed by a Kentucky util-
ity, if it were almost indistinguishable from that of Columbia
Gas, would also be declared insufficient to satisfy the constitu-
tional requirements of due process of law.
Having determined that the minimum standards required
by the Kentucky Public Service Commission's termination
procedure may well violate due process, it is necessary to at-
tempt to construct an acceptable procedure. The logical basis
for this endeavor is the process approved by the Sixth Circuit
in Palmer. The court affirmed the order of the district court"
which prohibited the termination of service until a representa-
0 807 KAR 2:010 § 11(2)(a) (1975).
" Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 168 (6th Cir. 1975).
65 Id.
6 Id.
67 Id. at 169.
11 Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972), afl'd, 479
F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
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tive of the company personally informed the consumer of the
proposed termination and the recourse available.69 If the con-
sumer failed to contact the company within 24 hours, service
could be terminated. If, however, the customer did respond
within that time, no further action was permitted until a com-
pany manager investigated the claim and explained the com-
pany's position in detail. If the dispute continued, termination
would be postponed for the litigation period upon the posting
of adequate bond."
Under Palmer, a Kentucky utility employing this
procedure would unquestionably satisfy the requirements of
due process. Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Palmer,2
however, have created uncertainty as to whether this procedure
represents the minimum requirement. 3 It is possible that a less
11 Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153, 159-60 (6th Cir. 1973).
,0 An amount equal to that in dispute would be deemed an adequate bond if
supported by good and sufficient surety. Id. at 160.
' Cf. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S.Ct. 719 (1975); Mitch-
ell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
72 North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975); Mitchell
v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
11 The Sixth Circuit's approval of the procedure outlined in the text was based
upon a justifiable reliance on the Supreme Court's exposition of extensive due process
requirements in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Subsequent to Palmer, the
Court reexamined the due process problem in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974). Commentators have been unable to discern the precise effect which the
Mitchell decision will have on the principles announced in Fuentes. See, e.g., Newton
& Timmons, Fuentes "Repossessed," 26 BAYLOR L. Rv. 469 (1974); Rendleman, The
New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531 (1975); Weinberg, Kentucky
Law Survey, Commercial Law, 63 Ky. L.J. 727 (1974-75). Even the Supreme Court
justices deciding the case were divided upon its effect. The majority opinion indicates
that Fuentes will be unaffected because Mitchell is clearly distinguishable on its facts.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 615-18 (1975). The concurring opinion of
Justice Powell states that Mitchell retains the Fuentes reasoning but withdraws from
the full reach of that reasoning. 416 U.S. at 623. And finally, the dissenting opinion,
endorsed by Justices Stewart, Douglas, and Marshall, states that Fuentes has been
unequivocably overruled. 416 U.S. at 634. In view of such extreme confusion, it is
impossible to do more than note that Fuentes, interpreting due process in connection
with specific statutes and facts, required a hearing prior to sequestration of property
and that Mitchell did not require such a hearing in a case involving different facts and
statutes.
To add to the confusion, the same justices who decided Mitchell have recently
ruled in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S.Ct. 719 (1975), that, on
the facts of that particular case, the opportunity for a hearing prior to attachment of
property is necessary to satisfy due process. Against this backdrop, one can only specu-
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elaborate procedure, one which eliminated the personal con-
tact requirement and abbreviated the administrative hearing,
would afford consumers due process of law.74 Nevertheless, in
the absence of any definitive guidelines from the Supreme
Court, Kentucky utilities would be wise to adopt the procedure
dictated by the Sixth Circuit and thus insulate themselves
from due process attack.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The procedures employed by privately owned Kentucky
utility companies purchasing electricity from the Tennessee
Valley Authority for the termination of electrical service are
vulnerable to attack on due process grounds. Because the fac-
tual context of such a case is readily distinguishable from that
presented in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 75 the Su-
preme Court's determination of no state action cannot be con-
sidered binding. Utilizing the reasoning and the sequential
mode of analysis advanced in Jackson, the activities of a TVA-
supplied Kentucky electric company may be deemed state ac-
tion on any one of three grounds; the performance of a public
function, the prescription of the termination procedure by the
Kentucky Public Service Commission, or the existence of a
symbiotic relationship between the utility and TVA. Assuming
that adequate state action exists to render the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments applicable, it
is possible to conclude that, based upon the Sixth Circuit's
decision in Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc.,76 the Kentucky ter-
late on the minimum requirements for a utility's termination of service procedure. It
must also be remembered that the due process requirements for termination of electri-
cal service, specifically considered by the Sixth Circuit in Palmer, are not necessarily
the same as the requirements in replevin and sequestration proceedings considered in
Fuentes and Mitchell.
,1 In Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 653 (7th Cir. 1972) the
Seventh Circuit rejected the Palmer court's ruling that mere notice of an unpaid
balance is insufficient to satisfy the "due process" requirements for the termination
of electrical service. The court in Lucas held that a customer is assumed to know of
his recourse available either through the company or the judicial system, and that the
omission of instruction to the customer as to how he can resolve his dispute is not a
fatal defect in the notice. Criticizing Lucas, see Clark & Landers, Sniadach, Fuentes
and Beyond: The Creditor Meets the Constitution, 59 VA. L. REv. 355, 392-95 (1973).
,5 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
78 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973).
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mination procedure authorized by the Public Service Commis-
sion violates due process. The absence of any established proce-
dure for the pretermination resolution of disputes is fatal.
Based upon the probability of finding a due process viola-
tion, it is recommended that the Kentucky Public Service
Commission develop a termination procedure similar to that
ordered by the court in Palmer. Such a process would effec-
tively serve the interests of the consumer by reducing mistaken
and unjustified terminations and by preventing unnecessary
hardship during the period required to settle any disagreement.
"[W]hen a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own
defense, and when the State must listen to what he has to say,
substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of prop-
erty interests can be prevented."7
Dale W. Bruckner
17 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
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